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INTRODUCTION 
This reply brief addresses new points raised in 
the respondent's brief and attempts to clarify the issues 
presented in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE REASONS WHY MADSEN I WAS 
BARRED DO NOT APPLY TO THIS ACTION 
A. FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
IS NOT A CONDITION PRECE-
DENT TO THE CURRENT ACTION 
Respondents draw much attention to the fact that 
no notice of claim was filed in Madsen I. This amounts to a 
1 
smoke screen. It has no bearing on appellant's ability to 
maintain this action. 
Prior to the 1983 amendment to Section 63-30-11, 
Utah Code Ann., the statute read: 
Service of the notice of claim upon an 
employee of a governmental entity is not 
a condition precedent to the commence-
ment of an action or special proceeding 
against such person. If an action or 
special proceeding is commenced against 
the employee, but not against the 
governmental entity, service of a notice 
of claim is required only if the entity 
has a statutory duty to indemnify such 
person (emphasis added). 
When this is examined in connection with Section 63-48-3, 
Utah Code Ann. , it is clear that no notice of claim was 
necessary because no statutory duty exists to obligate the 
state to pay a judgment against the defendants if they were 
grossly negligent. §63-48-3(4). In this action either the 
defendants were grossly negligent, or there can be no 
judgment against them at all. 
Madsen contends that the filing of a notice of 
claim was not a condition precedent to bringing this action 
because the state has no duty to indemnify the respondents 
due to the claim of gross negligence. U.C.A. 63-30-11, and 
U.C.A. 63-48-3(4). 
The respondents contend that the filing of a 
notice of claim was necessary because nullification of the 
duty to indemnify occurs only after gross negligence is 
established at trial. Therefore, respondents claim that 
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this action cannot proceed because no notice of claim was 
filed. 
Respondents' position creates an impossible 
situation. If nullification of the indemnification can only 
be established at trial. And if an action is brought 
against state employees in their individual capacity on 
allegations of gross negligence (or fraud or malice). And 
if no notice of claim was filed within the allotted time 
period through reliance on U.C.A. 63-30-11, then a plain-
tiff's case would never make it to trial because the lack of 
a filed notice of claim would always prove fatal. This 
would make the language of U.C.A. 63-30-11 void of meaning 
wherein it proclaimed that under certain circumstances, a 
notice of claim need not be filed when the claim is against 
a governmental employee. It is a general rule of statutory 
construction that statutes must be construed so as to make 
them harmonious with other statutes relevant to the subject 
matter. Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Ut. 
1980) . This problem was perhaps one reason why the legisla-
ture made some of the 1983 amendments to the Governmental 
Immunity Act. However, for the purposes of this case, which 
arose long before the amendments, no notice of claim was 
necessary. 
B. THE DISMISSAL IN MADSEN I 
WAS FOR FAILING TO FILE A 
NOTICE OF CLAIM, AND WAS 
NOT ON THE MERITS 
The district court's order of dismissal in Madsen 
I did not state that the action was being dismissed with 
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prejudice. Rather, it was silent thereon. Hence, the court 
must look at why the action failed. 
This court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P. 2d 627 
(1983) , found: (1) that the governmental immunity act 
applied to the claim being brought by the plaintiffs and 
thus; (2) since the act applied, filing a notice of claim 
was necessary. Since no notice of claim was filed, dismis-
sal was proper. The decision does not say that plaintiffs 
did not have a cause of action, rather it said there was no 
cause of action outside of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
This is because of the exclusive nature of the act. U.C.A. 
63-30-4. Without the filing of a notice of claim, a claim 
against the government is barred in any event by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Because the act applies, failure 
to file a notice of claim is a fatal defect. 658 P. 2d at 
631-2. 
As explained more fully in Appellant's first 
brief, Madsen I failed because of a procedural defect. The 
actual merits of the claim as it stood under the Govern-
mental Immunity Act were not considered by the district 
court. The plaintiffs were never permitted to reach the 
point where their rights and defendants1 liabilities were 
considered under the cause of action. This is all because 
of the procedural dismissal for failing to file the notice 
of claim. If the notice of claim provision is likened unto 
4 
a key, the lack of a key at a locked door bars one from 
entering the room behind it. Hence no consideration can be 
had of what lies beyond the door. 
The dismissal of Madsen I was not on the merits. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS CAN ONLY BE SUED 
IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY 
Respondents claim that Mr. Borthick and Mr. 
Brimhall were named in their representative capacity in the 
current action. This obviously cannot be so. 
Madsen I was dismissed for plaintifffs failure to 
file a notice of claim. Plaintiffs did not file a notice of 
claim within the time limits allowed by law. Accordingly, 
the appellants could not bring a second action against the 
state or its employees in their respective capacity. 
Appellants believe that what the former commissioners of the 
Department of Financial Institutions did do and failed to do 
amounted not just to negligence, but also amounted to gross 
negligence. For this reason they brought the current action 
against the only potential defendants available to them 
individuals. 
It is important to understand that an employee of 
the government may, by failing to fulfill his duties, be 
they statutory or otherwise, be guilty of gross negligence. 
It all depends upon the standard of care involved and what 
was not done that was required to be done. This is the 
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issue for the trial court to decide to proceed to discovery 
and trial. The Governmental Immunity Act, prior to the 1983 
amendments, did not protect an employee who was grossly 
negligent in how he performed (or failed to perform) his 
official duties. U.C.A. 63-30-4. Respondents misstate the 
issue when they claim that the former commissioners could 
be sued in a personal capacity for gross negligence only if 
they had certain private contacts with Grove Finance outside 
of their contact and duties through the Department of 
Financial Institutions. The duty and the breach thereof 
make up a cause of action. A breach of a duty which amounts 
to gross negligence subjects a governmental employee to 
individual liability. 
The complaint in this action would have been 
clearer if it had specifically stated that the defendants 
were being sued in their individual capacity. However, it 
does not. But in light of the above, this is not critical 
or fatal. The substance of the pleadings is not inconsis-
tent with a cause of action for gross negligence. 
POINT III 
SECTION 63-30-4, U.C.A., DOES NOT 
BAR THE CURRENT ACTION SINCE ACTS OF 
GROSS NEGLIGENCE WERE NOT PROTECTED 
BY THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Section 63-30-4, U.C.A., provides that the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act contains the exclusive remedy 
against a governmental entity or its employee. The excep-
tion to this rule is the clause which removes the protective 
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umbrella of the act from employees who acted or failed to 
act through gross negligence, fraud, or malice. In such a 
situation, the employee shall be held personally liable. 
U.C.A. 63-30-4. 
The 1983 amendments to the Governmental Immunity 
Act make this clear. This is shown through how gross 
negligence was specifically brought within the exclusive 
reaches of the act by the 1983 amendments. As a result, 
only fraud and malice on the part of an employee will 
subject him to personal liability. U.C.A. 63-30-4(3) and 
(4) , as amended. U.C.A. 63-30-11 was also amended to now 
require a timely notice of claim for claims against an 
employee as well as against the entity where the act or 
omission occurred during the performance of his duties, or 
under color of authority. U.C.A. 63-30-11 was amended to 
allow a governmental entity to insure its employees against 
liability not just for negligent acts or omissions (as the 
former provided) but for any act or omissions occurring 
during the performance of duties or under color of 
authority. This is reflective of a move to protect 
employees against liability for gross negligence. These 
changes acknowledge that a governmental employee, even 
though he was proceeding under color of authority, may be 
found to have acted or failed to act through what amounts to 
gross negligence. 
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Hence, it can be seen that prior to the 1983 
amendments, the statutes did not act to prevent a govern-
mental employee from being personally liable because he was 
grossly negligent. 
POINT IV 
MADSEN'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT DEFEATED 
BY THE DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST ACTION 
Respondents allege that Madsen's complaint in this 
case fails to state a valid cause of action. They complain 
that the current cause of action for gross negligence is 
essentially the same as that in the complaint in Madsen I, 
and hence is invalid because the first action was dismissed. 
Respondents fail to recognize that a cause of 
action for gross negligence is separate from one for simple 
negligence. It is ordinarily for the jury to decide whether 
the conduct complained of amounts to gross negligence or 
falls short and constitutes simple negligence or even no 
breach of duty at all. 
The line of calpability between that 
conduct which is simply negligent and 
that conduct which is clearly inten-
tional is a matter of degree. 
Terms such as willful negligence, gross 
negligence and willful misconduct fall 
on that line of culpability somewhere 
between simple negligence and clearly 
intentional conduct and involve elements 
of both. 
Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877 (TJt. 1979). Simple 
negligence, gross negligence, willful misconduct, and 
intentional conduct may all arise out of the same fact 
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situation. In the event of a dispute as to the facts, the 
jury must decide what level of culpability attaches to those 
facts. 
In Madsen I, there was no determination made as to 
whether defendant Borthick's actions constituted "a negli-
gent act of omission of an employee". 658 P.2d at 631-632. 
Because the lesser charge of negligence was not resolved in 
the first action, Madsen is not precluded from alleging a 
cause of action for a higher degree of negligence. The door 
to do this was left open when the court in Madsen v. 
Borthick found that plaintiff's complaint made no 
allegations of gross negligence. 658 P.2d at 633. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons fully set forth in appellant's 
first brief and clarified in this Reply Brief, Madsen 
respectfully requests this court to remand the case back to 
the district court so that discovery may be made and so that 
this case may proceed to trial. 
DATED this /0w day of May, 1984. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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